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A chief conclusion of this study is that nuclear weapons exert an indirect but far-
reaching influence on the security thinking, practice, and interaction of nuclear 
weapon states, their allies, and nuclear weapon aspirant states in the Asian security 
region. On the surface nuclear weapons appear to play a modest role. Except for 
a brief period (1998-2002) in India-Pakistan relations, they have been less visible 
. in comparison to the Cold War era, and they appear less salient than conven-
tional military force in dealing with the immediate security chlllenges confront-
ing states in the region. Even in the small number of situations where they are 
relevant, nuclear weapons remain in the background and appear to augment con-
ventional forces. The emphasis in the region on modernizing and building con-
ventional military capabilities would seem to further support th.e contention that 
nuclear weapons play a modest role in national security. A closer look, however, 
suggests that they are much more consequential. 
Nuclear weapons cast a long shadow that informs in fundamental ways the stra-
tegic policies and behavior of major powers (all but one of which possess nuclear 
weapons), their allies, and those states facing existential threats. They induce cau-
tion and set boundaries to the strategic interaction of nuclear weapon states and 
. condition the role and use of force in their interactions. The danger of escalation 
limits military options in a crisis between nuclear weapon states and shapes the 
purpose and manner in which military force is used. Although relevant only in a 
small number of situations, these include the most serious regional conflicts that 
could escalate to large-scale war. Nuclear weapons help prevent the outbreak of 
hostilities, keep hostilities limited when they do break out, and prevent their es-
calation to major wars. Nuclear weapons enable weaker powers to deter stronger 
adversaries and help ameliorate the effects of imbalance in conventional military 
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capability. By providing insurance to cope with unanticipated contingencies, they 
reduce immediate anxieties over military imbalances and vulnerabilities. Nuclear 
weapons enable major powers to take a long view of the strategic environment, set 
a moderate pace for their force development, and focus on other national priorities, 
including mutually beneficial interaction with other nuclear weapon states. Al-
though nuclear weapons by themselves do not confer major power status, they are 
an important ingredient of power for countries that conduct themselves in a respon-
sible manner and are experiencing rapid growth in other dimensions of power. 
For allied states, the extended deterrence protection provided by a nuclear 
weapon major power assuages security concerns, reduces or eliminates the incen-
tive to develop their own nuclear weapon capability, influences their force mix 
and posture, and enables them to gradually develop bridging capabilities to assume 
greater security responsibilities including strengthening their own conventional 
deterrence. It also restricts their military options, induces caution in their behavior, 
and enables them to pursue other national priorities without intensifying existing · · 
security dilemmas. For states and regimes confronting existential threats, nuclear 
weapons (their own or those of an ally) are perceived as the ultimate security 
guarantee. Although they do not rely solely or even primarily on nuclear weapons, 
possession or availability of such capability is perceived as essential to deter much 
stronger adversaries. The risk of uncertainty and potential for escalation induces 
caution and limits the military options available to adversaries. Under certain con-
ditions nuclear weapons may enhance the diplomatic leverage of nuclear weapon 
states. The long shadow cast by nuclear weapons is also evident in the widespread 
international concern over the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states 
especially nonstate actors, the danger of nuclear theft, smuggling, formal and black 
market trade in dual use technology and material, and in the national and interna-
tional safeguard measures instituted to prevent such occurrences and practices. 
The influence of nuclear weapons is manifest in the national security 
cies of states, their nuclear doctrines, in the modernization and development 
nuclear arsenals, and in the development of ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
counterforce capabilities. It is also evident in changes in regional security ctv·na.m.;. 
ics (strengthening alliances, mitigating or intensifying security dilemmas, 
lating regional initiatives), and in the international measures instituted to 
concerns relating to the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, and material 
additional states and nonstate actors. The influence of nuclear weapons in the 
temporary era, however, is more subtle and implied than the explicit threats 
deployments that characterized the Cold War period. 
The study advances four propositions on the role of nuclear weapons in 
tional security in the twenty-first century strategic environment. First, the 
mary role of nuclear weapons now and in the foreseeable future is basic or 
deterrence. Nuclear weapons also prevent blackmail, preserve strategic autoltlOIID}'. 
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(freedom to act), and provide insurance to cope with unanticipated developments 
in a changing strategic environment. The offensive and defensive roles of nuclear 
weapons are relatively marginal in utility and appear unlikely to surpass the deter-
rence role or even increase much in importance in the foreseeable future. Only the 
United States is developing significant offensive and defensive capabilities. Tech-
nological limitations, funding constraints, the relatively low cost of maintaining 
a strike force that can penetrate ballistic missile defense systems, the preferences 
and capabilities (conventional and nuclear) of other states, and the generally stable 
political and strategic environment in the Asian security region are likely to limit 
the employment of nuclear weapons in these roles. 
Second, although deterrence continues to be the dominant role and strategy 
for the employment of nuclear weapons, the conception and practice of deterrence 
is different from the mutual assured destruction condition that characterized the 
Soviet-American nuclear confrontation during the Cold War and varies across 
countries. Deterrence in the contemporary era is largely asymmetric in nature 
with weaker powers relying on nuclear weapons to deter stronger adversaries. 
Variations in goals and a broad range of capabilities have resulted in a spectrum 
of overlapping deterrence strategies ranging from existential deterrence through 
minimum deterrence to assured retaliation. At base all deterrence strategies rely 
on the threat of punishment. They differ in the force level required to deter, cer-
tainty of retaliation, and in the threats to be deterred. Existential and minimum 
deterrence rely more on uncertainty, the risks of escalation and early launch, and 
the absolute destruction that would result from a nuclear attack. As the name im-
plies, there is a much higher degree of certainty in the capability to retaliate and 
.inflict catastrophic damage in a strategy of assured retaliation. Existential deter-
rence is concerned primarily with state or regime survival; minimum deterrence 
is a default option for a state with a small nuclear arsenal concerned with deterring 
a stronger adversary. Assured retaliation seeks to deter a nuclear attack, includ-
a first strike by a substantial nuclear weapon state. Both established and new 
nuclear powers are still defining and developing nuclear strategies to cope with a 
new strategic environment that is likely to further evolve. In addition, "new" nu-
weapon states often do not have the requisite capability to effectively imple-
their professed strategies. Consequently, there are inconsistencies between 
declaratory and operational doctrines, as well as behavior in a crisis situation. 
Third, the absence of severe confrontations and the limited capabilities of the 
small Asian nuclear arsenals have resulted in general deterrence pos-
The United States seeks capabilities to deal with a wide array of threats, 
but it does not confront an immediate conflict or crisis situation that warrants 
threats that could result in nuclear retaliation. Its threats to rogue 
, for example, tend to be general; and those in relation to contingencies 
China are usually vague and implied. Other countries have chosen to 
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focus on their principal concerns. With the exception of India and Pakistan, they 
too do not confront situations that warrant nuclear threats. There are very few ; , 
instances in which intense and immediate hostilities have resulted in the issuance 
of specific nuclear threats or the development of capabilities to carry them out. In 
all other cases, nuclear deterrence in Asia is implied and indirect. States maintain 
a broad range of capabilities, including nuclear weapons, and issue general threats 
to dissuade other states from thinking seriously about aggression. 
Finally, extended nuclear deterrence continues to be important to the national 
security of U.S. allied states in East Asia. China and certainly India and Pakistan 
do not have the capability or the ,strategic imperative to provide strategic protec-
tion to an ally against a threat from another nuclear power. Russia has the capa-
bility and plans to extend the deterrence function of its nuclear arsenal to protect 
Byelorussia and Armenia. The circumstances in which such strategic protection 
would become necessary, however, are fuzzy. Only the United States has the ca-
pability and strategic imperative to extend the deterrence function of its nuclear 
arsenal to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and implicitly Taiwan. All these coun-
tries desire the strategic protection of the United States. Japan does not confront 
an imminent nuclear or large-scale conventional threat, but it is concerned about 
a rising China that is modernizing its nuclear force and a nuclear-armed North 
Korea. Viewing the U.S. extended deterrence commitment as essential for Japan's 
security, Tokyo not only seeks reaffirmation of that commitment but also to in-
crease its credibility in the eyes of potential adversaries and its domestic public. 
Since the early 1990s the salience of extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea's 
security has declined. Nevertheless, Seoul sees the U.S. commitment as critical to 
maintain its nonnuclear posture in the context of a nuclear-armed North Korea 
and as a fallback while building a "national self-reliant defense" capability. For 
Australia, the U.S. extended deterrence commitment serves a rather remote but 
crucial function: to deter a nuclear attack on that country. The probability of an 
attack that would warrant U.S. nuclear retaliation is very low. Nevertheless, Can-
berra values the U.S. commitment because it is believed to contribute to global 
and regional security order and to provide other benefits to Australia. The Ameri-
can security guarantee continues to be critical for Taiwan, but nuclear weapons 
feature only indirectly in that guarantee. 
The above discussion highlights the importance of the U.S. extended deter-
rence commitment to the security of America's allies in East Asia, especially Japan 
and South Korea. The U.S. commitment serves crucial symbolic and psychologi-, 
cal functions; it reassures allies against long-range threats and prevents them from 
pursuing independent nuclear options. At the same time, it is relevant only in a 
narrow set of rather unlikely circumstances. And the competing interests and de-
mands of allies make it difficult for the United States to move beyond declaratory 
statements. The pressure from Japan to consult and operationalize the U.S. ex-
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tended deterrence commitment could create complications for the United States 
and possibly intensify security dilemmas in Northeast Asia. 
Indirect but Far-Reaching Influence 
Evidence can be adduced to support two competing claims on the salie~ce of 
nuclear weapons for national and international security in Asia. One readmg Is 
that nuclear weapons are only marginally relevant to the many secunty challenges 
confronting the United States, Russia, and the Asian nuclear weapon states. They 
are irrelevant in dealing with internal ethnic and religious confhcts, pollt~~all_e­
gitimacy challenges, international terrorism, and most international terntonal ~Is­
putes. And they appear only indirectly relevant in the management o~ the confhcts 
across the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula. China has arti~ulated force 
as a key element of its Taiwan policy but its emphasis has been o~ ~U1ldmg sh~rt­
and medium-range conventional warhead missiles and an amphiblOus capa~Il~ty. 
Nuclear threat and nuclear attack will work against its political goal of umfymg 
Taiwan with the mainland. However, nuclear weapons may be implicitly rel~vant 
in deterring U.S. intervention in the event of cross-Strait hostilities. ConventiOnal 
deterrence seems strong on the Korean peninsula. South Korea and the Umted 
States have sufficient conventional military capability to defeat North Korean ag-
gression. Although North Korea has tested a nuclear device, it does not have an 
operational nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang's primary instrument fo~ defense an~ de-
terrence is still its large and lethal conventional military capability. ConventiOnal 
military capability is also the mainstay of the force postures oflsrael and Iran, both 
of which perceive existential threats. Nuclear weapons are in the f~refront only 
in the India-Pakistan dyad. Even here, the two countries rely on theu substanual 
conventional military capabilities as the first line of defense and deterre~ce: 
All countries in the Asian security region are modernizing and bmldmg up 
their conventional military capabilities. And, except for the United States and 
Russia, the nuclear arsenals of the Asian countries are rather smalL Nuclear mod-
ernization and development of additional capabilities are under way, but the pace 
is relatively moderate. There is no rush to build large nuclear arsenals, and there 
is no nuclear arms race in the region. All these elements would suggest that states 
rely primarily \)n their conventional military capabilities and ~t~er pohcy i~stru­
ments (political compromise, diplomatic negotiations, economic mcent1ves, ~nt~r­
nationallaw) to deal with most of the immediate security challenges. In this hne 
of argument the overall salience of nuclear weapons is low. 
The second reading would be that, from about the late 1990s, nuclear we~pons 
have become more significant in the national security policies and strateg~es of 
states in the Asian security region. The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, 
the ensuing crisis between those two countries, and their ongoing development 
of operational nuclear forces; the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the 
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United States (U.S. Department of Defense 2002), which identified several ................ ., 
contingencies in Asia, including China, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran; the ontgotiDJ~: 
U.S. effort to develop a multilayered missile defense system; Moscow's en1pt1as1 
on nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of Russia's sovereignty and its 
opposition to the United States' missile defense plans; North Korea's nuclear 
and Iran's quest for nuclear weapons; the demand by Japan and South Korea 
plicit reaffirmation of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment; continued 
nese nuclear modernization; the U.S. concern that Chinese nuclear m<>dt:rnlZ<ttlC)Ji 
has proceeded faster than anticipated and that China is developing ""·'•~·'"""".c. 
weapons (U.S. Department of Dyfense 2007); and the ratification of the ..,uuutc:'<ll~ 
Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty in I997= All these 
opments attest to the growing signif1cance attached to nuclear weapons. 
This study supports the second reading and argues that nuclear weapons are 
becoming a crucial component of national security policies and postures of " 
in the Asian security region. Though less visible, their influence is far reaching · .. 
the strategic interaction of major powers, in the management of critical conflicts, 
including limiting military options in crisis situations, in addressing the """vua.~ 
security threats confronting weak and isolated states, and in the international 
cern and response to the possible spread of nuclear weapons to additional states 
nonstate actors. 
Bound Major Power Strategic Interaction 
The fear of escalation to nuclear war conditions the role of force in major powei; 
relations and circumscribes strategic interaction among them. By restraining mea"" 
sures and actions that could lead to conflict escalation, nuclear weapons limit the 
competitive strategic interaction of major powers to internal and external balanc~, 
ing for deterrence purposes; constrain their resort to coercive diplomacy and com-
pellence; and shift the burden of international competition and adjustment in status 
and influence to the economic, political, and diplomatic arenas. They also render · 
remote the possibility of a hegemonic war should a power transition occur in the 
region. More immediately, nuclear weapons enable Russia and China to deter the · 
much stronger United States and mitigate the negative consequences of the imbal-
ance in conventional military capability. Nuclear weapons reinforce India's confi-
dence in dealing with China. By reducing military vulnerabilities and providing 
insurance against unexpected contingencies, nuclear weapons enable major powers 
to take a long view and engage in competition as well as cooperation with poten-
tial adversaries. Differences and disputes among them are frozen or settled through 
negotiations. Though they are not the only or even primary factor driving strate-
gic visions and policies, nuclear weapons are an important consideration, especially 
in the role of force in major power strategic interaction. They prevent the outbreak 
oflarge-scale war. Military clashes when they occur tend to be limited. 
Nuclear Weapons and National Security 
Condition Regional Conflict Management 
Nuclear weapons have a low profile in the conflicts across the Taiwan Strait 
and on the Korean peninsula. Conventional military capability dominates deploy-
ment, perception ofimmediate threat, and response to them. However, the danger 
of escalation to nuclear war determines the role and deployment of conventional 
military force. That danger also shapes the range and choice of military options 
in a crisis and the risks that states are willing to take in pursuit of their objectives. 
The risk of nuclear war not only tempers the means but also influences short- and 
medium-range goals. Although the nuclear threat is implicit in the Taiwan con-
flict, the danger of nuclear escalation and retaliation induces caution, deters large-
scale conventional attack by China, restrains American military intervention, and 
limits the military options available to both countries. The nuclear consideration, 
along with others, also tempers the urgency of Beijing's unification goal and in-
duces Washington to restrain Taiwanese leaders advocating the independence op-
tion. Similarly on the Korean Peninsula, nuclear weapons provide an important 
backdrop. North Korea views nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of its 
security; this in tum has increased the relevance of the American nuclear umbrella 
for South Korea. Nuclear weapons figure more prominently in the India-Pakistan 
conflict. Pakistan attempted to exploit the danger of escalation to nuclear war to 
alter the status quo. However, that risk also conditioned how it used force and the 
Indian response to the Pakistani military action. In all three conflicts, the shadow 
of nuclear escalation circumscribes military action. Though small in number and 
appearing relatively stable, these conflicts are the most likely sources of major war 
in the region. Nuclear weapons condition their management in significant ways 
and in essence take large-scale war off the table. 
Ultimate Security Guarantee 
Among the states that perceive existential threats, Pakistan relies more imme-
diately and substantially on its nuclear weapon capability to mitigate the negative 
effects of the imbalance in conventional military capability and deter large-scale 
conventional and nuclear attack by India. It also seeks to exploit the danger of 
escalation to nuclear war to support its Kashmir policy. Israel relies primarily on 
its strong conventional forces to deter and defeat Arab aggression. Its substantial 
nuclear arsenal remains opaque, and Israel has avoided explicit nuclear threats or 
reference to nuclear weapons in its security strategy. Despite this, nuclear weapons 
are perceived as providing the ultimate security guarantee, and Israel has steadily 
built up its nuclear arsenal. For North Korea, although it still has a large and lethal 
conventional military capability, its advantage in the conventional military bal-
ance has steadily declined. Diplomatically isolated and economically weak, North 
Korea sees nuclear weapons as an essential reinforcement of its conventional 
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military capability to deter American aggression. Likewise, Iran, witnessing the 
reluctance of the United States to attack a nuclear capable North Korea and the 
lack of regional support for such an attack, may perceive nuclear weapons as es-
sential to deter a U.S. attack. Taiwan does not have nuclear weapons, but the 
implicit American security guarantee including its nuclear umbrella deters large-
scale Chinese military attack. 
Concern Over New Proliferation 
The influence of nuclear weapons is also evident in the international concern 
over and response to the possible spread of nuclear weapons to additional states 
and nonstate actors. That the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability by North 
Korea and Iran may undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime, threaten 
neighboring states, and alter regional security dynamics in Northeast Asia and 
the Middle East underscores the international effort through the United Nations, 
the Six-Party Talks, and the European Union to address the nuclear challenges 
posed by these two countries. In addition to multilateral efforts, the United Sta~es 
initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict transportation of 
nuclear material and technology from North Korea, retains the force option in 
dealing with the Iranian challenge, has reaffirmed its extended deterrence com-
mitment to Japan and South Korea, and has taken measures to strengthen its se-
curity ties with allies and friends in the Middle East. The North Korean test has 
generated substantive discussion in Japan on its own nuclear option and on the 
effort to make the U.S. commitment more credible. At the regional level, Asian 
states have initiated the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Nonproliferation to discuss 
and evaluate regional commitments and efforts to prevent proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction (WMD); some have joined the PSI; and the Southeast 
Asian countries have revived the idea of a nuclear weapon-free Southeast Asia to 
prevent spillover effects from the nuclearization of the Northeast and South Asian 
subregions (see Chapter 16 of this volume). 
Also of grave concern is the challenge posed by the possible acquisition of 
nuclear and other WMD by nonstate extremist groups. Though the possibility of 
such groups acquiring nuclear weapons is low, even a small possibility is consid-
ered highly dangerous because of the enormous damage that can be inflicted by 
such weapons (see Kapur, Chapter II of this volume). "Rogue" states like North 
Korea and Iran may be difficult to deter, but it is believed that traditional deter-
rence cannot work against nonstate groups that have no return address. This fear 
and the associated concerns relating to theft and illegal trade in nuclear weapon-
related material and technology have resulted in a wide range of countermeasures 
with consequences for security interaction at the global and regional levels. In 
sum, though less visible, nuclear weapons have far-reaching influence on national . 
security strategies, on the strategic interaction of nuclear weapon states and their 
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allies, and in the international response to the possible further spread of nuclear 
. weapons. They have and could further alter security dynamics in Northeast Asia, 
South Asia, the Middle East, and the Asian security region as a whole. For nuclear 
weapon states and their allies, nuclear weapons serve important deterrence func-
tions, help them cope with unexpected contingencies (insurance), and preserve 
their freedom to act (strategic autonomy). The nuclear arsenals of Asian states are 
likely to grow in quantity and quality, although such growth will be graduaL As 
capabilities increase, the salience of nuclear weapons in national security strate-
gies would further increase. However, nuclear weapons appear unlikely to occupy 
center stage as they did during the Cold War. Barring unforeseen circumstances, 
the present development-focused national priorities and the generally stable Asian 
security environment are likely to prevent severe confrontations and intense stra-
tegic competition among major powers (see Alagappa, Chapter I of this volume). 
The Primary Role of Basic Deterrence 
The primary function of nuclear weapons in the Asian security region is basic 
deterrence-that is, preventing large-scale conventional attack and deterring any 
form of nuclear attack against the homeland of a nuclear weapon state. China, 
Russia, India, and Pakistan all see nuclear weapons as essential to balance and deter 
stronger powers that threaten or might threaten their interests and to preserve pol-
icy autonomy in a context of American dominance and a rising China and India. 
The United States views nuclear weapons as necessary for contingencies involving 
China and to deter Russia if relations with that country deteriorate. It is unclear if 
the U.S. nuclear arsenal has a counterforce role against Russia and China and if it is 
developing BMD against both these countries. Even if the United States were suc-
cessful in developing these capabilities, the political purposes for which it would 
use them is unclear. Some states see a role for nuclear weapons to deter chemical 
and biological attacks on their homelands as well. And some countries have at-
tempted to deploy nuclear weapons in coercive diplomacy, war fighting, and stra-
tegic defense roles. In 1999, Pakistan engaged in coercive diplomacy by exploiting 
the risk of escalation to nuclear war. In response, India too engaged in coercive 
diplomacy and explored limited war under nuclear conditions. In its 2002 NPR 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2002), the United States indicated a shift in emphasis 
from deterrence to offensive and defensive strategies. The ensuing discussion of 
nuclear policies and strategies of relevant states and their behavior in conflict situa-
tions reveals the limitations of the offensive and defensive roles of nuclear weapons 
and highlights basic deterrence as the most important role for nuclear weapons. 
China-United States Dyad 
The United States is the principal international security concern for China (see 
Chu and Rong, Chapter 5 of this volume). Although there are bilateral concerns 
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and disputes, China views Russia as too weak and India as too distant to consti-
tute significant security threats. Further, relations with Russia are good and those 
with India are on the mend. In China's view, after the United States, Japan is the 
country most likely to present a future security threat. However, Japan is not a 
nuclear weapon state, and China has deliberately deemphasized its nuclear forces 
in relation to that country for fear of provoking it into acquiring nuclear weapons. 
For the foreseeable future, the principal Chinese nuclear concern centers on the 
United States. 
For the United States, China is the principal concern in Asia. The 2006 Qua-
drennial Defense Review Report states "of the major and emerging powers, China 
has the greatest potential to co~pete militarily with the United States" (U.S. De.,. 
partment of Defense 2006: 29). Earlier, the 2002 U.S. NPR (U.S. Department 
of Defense 2002) identified China as a potential nuclear contingency because of 
the uncertainty over that country's strategic objectives and because it is rapidly 
modernizing its nuclear forces. That NPR also identifies Taiwan as an immediate 
nuclear contingency, although the public version does not state why it is a nuclear 
contingency and how nuclear weapons may be relevant to that conflict. The U.S. 
Defense Department's 2007 report on China's military power asserts that China's 
expanding military capability is a major factor in changing the East Asian mili-
tary balance, that improvement in Chinese strategic capabilities may provide that 
country with new options, and that China's antisatellite programs have significant 
implications for antiaccess/area denial in Taiwan Strait contingencies and beyond. 
War or intense rivalry between the United States and China could arise from 
one or more of three developments: escalation of a military conflict across the 
Taiwan Strait, an explicit U.S. strategy to prevent or contain the rise of China, 
or a Chinese decision to challenge the primacy of the United States. As high-
lighted in Chapter r of this volume, although Beijing is increasing its international 
power and influence, it does not have the capability or the imperative to chal-
lenge American primacy in the foreseeable future. For its part, Washington seeks 
to engage and constrain China, not contain it. The U.S. purpose is to integrat.e 
China as a responsible power into an international system dominated by American 
values. Neither country views confrontation as inevitable or useful. Except pos-
sibly on the Taiwan issue, it is in China's interest to avoid confrontation with the 
United States. 
ln regard to the Taiwan conflict, the primary function of nuclear weapons is to 
deter intervention and aggression. China does not threaten nuclear attack to pre-
vent Taiwan's independence or to forcefully unify that island state with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (PRC). It would be self-defeating for the PRC to threaten 
use of nuclear weapons against a territory and people it claims as its own. Further, 
because Taiwan is geographically close to China, the fallout from a nuclear at-
tack on Taiwan would affect parts of China as welL Threatening to use nuclear 
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weapons against Taiwan would also tarnish Beijing's international image. For all 
these reasons, any use of force by China against Taiwan is highly likely to be con-
ventionaL For its part, Taiwan seeks to deter the PRC through its own conven-
tional military capability and the American security commitment. 
For the present, nuclear weapons are relevant only in the U.S.-PRC dimension 
of the Taiwan conflict. Beijing hopes that the implicit risk of escalation to nuclear 
war and the prospect of a nuclear retaliatory strike on the United States will induce 
caution in Washington, deter American military intervention, and compel Wash-
ington to rein in Taiwanese leaders who espouse independence. In some ways, the 
Chinese approach is akin to Thomas Schelling's "threats that leave something to 
chance," in which deterrence flows from a situation rather than from an explicit 
threat to escalate or retaliate (Schelling 1966: 12rn). The American military ob-
jective is to deter Chinese military action against Taiwan and prevent unification 
by force. American deterrence is primarily conventionaL However, by virtue of 
its nuclear arsenal, American deterrence of China inevitably includes a nuclear 
dimension. The 2002 NPR identifies Taiwan as a nuclear contingency. Although 
neither the United States nor China has articulated a policy or a strategy that 
would involve the use of nuclear weapons, this does not imply that nuclear weap-
ons are irrelevant. The risk of conflict escalation is an ever-present possibility. 
That risk, however, helps deter the outbreak of hostilities and makes large-scale 
conventional war unlikely. 
A few analysts in both countries have suggested that nuclear weapons could 
have an intrawar role in the conflict. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press (2oo6, 2007), for 
example, suggest that, in the event of military conflict across the Taiwan Strait, 
the United States might deploy its nuclear primacy to threaten China with a dis-
arming first strike to prevent China from alerting its strategic forces and to keep 
nuclear weapons out of the conflict. This presumes China would introduce nu-
clear weapons in the event of overt hostilities. Despite remarks by some Chinese 
arialysts that China should reconsider its no-first-use (NFU) policy and that the 
United States should expect nuclear retaliation if it intervenes in the Taiwan con-
flict, it is not in China's interest or its policy to pursue such a course of action (see 
Chu and Rong, Chapter 5 of this volume). And the United States would likely re-
spond to Chinese military action in the Taiwan Strait with conventional military 
force unless Beijing attacks U.S. territory. 
Beijing's objective in the nuclear arena is to build a robust strategic force to 
deter an American attack (conventional and nuclear) on its homeland. If deter-
rence fails, it wants to have a survivable and capable force to retaliate and inflict 
catastrophic damage on the U.S. mainland. As observed earlier, in the case of the 
Taiwan conflict, Chinese nuclear weapons have an implicit deterrence role. It is 
not in China's interest to introduce nuclear weapons into that conflict in support 
of coercive diplomacy or for war-fighting purposes. 
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Though not publicly articulated, it seems reasonable to assume that a primary . 
function of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to deter large-scale Chinese conventional 
and nuclear attack on American territory. Implicitly, the U.S. nuclear capability 
also deters a Chinese attack to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. It is 
unclear how and when the United States will respond to a Chinese attack on Tai-
wan and whether nuclear retaliation will be contemplated. Much will depend on 
the situation and whether China introduces nuclear weapons. The United States . 
appears increasingly concerned that Chinese space programs may undermine tra-
ditional American military advantages in relation to the Taiwan conflict. The 
deterrence function of the U.S: nuclear arsenal is not controversial, but some have 
argued that the United States is intentionally building nuclear primacy and that it .. • 
is on the cusp of achieving the capability to disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals 
of Russia and China (Lieber and Press 2007). 
Whether the U.S. has a disarming capability against Russia is open to debate. 
Against China, which has a much smaller nuclear force, it is likely that the United 
States has substantial counterforce capability. Nevertheless, from an operational 
perspective, unless the United States can be absolutely certain it can destroy all 
Chinese strategic assets, having a substantial capability may not provide a military 
advantage. Even if the United States has a disarming capability against China, the 
key question is what political purpose would it serve. As noted earlier, an intense 
confrontation with the United States is not in China's interest, and Beijing has 
deliberately avoided such confrontation. In the absence of serious provocation, 
a disarming U.S. strike against China seems hardly credible. If the rise of China 
is posited as a credible reason, why has the United States refrained from striking 
China while its nuclear capability is still relatively weak? That Washington con-
templated such a strike in 1964 is irrelevant. China was not a rising power then, 
and it was also not a nuclear power. Even under those conditions the United States 
chose not to carry out a preventive strike. It seems incredible that Washington 
might now or in the future carry out a disarming strike against a powerful and 
nuclear-armed China. The uncertainty of success and the catastrophic cost to 
both countries would outweigh any rational gain. 
Lieber and Press posit that the United States may gain coercive leverage from 
its nuclear primacy in a future crisis over Taiwan. Washington could warn Beijing 
that China would face a disarming first strike if it alerted its strategic forces. As 
noted earlier, it is in China's interest to keep nuclear weapons out of the conflict. 
It does not have to be threatened with a disarming first strike to do so. The same 
coercive leverage can be had from a secure second-strike capability that can inflict 
unacceptable damage. The Lieber and Press argument is similar to the second-
wave theorizing of deterrence that accorded priority to technology, military ca-
pability, and the logic of the destructive power of nuclear weapons rather than to 
politics and policy. Although scenarios for the offensive use of nuclear weapons 
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could be imagined, the indisputable primary role ofU.S. nuclear weapons in rela-
tion to China is deterrence. 
China relates its strategic deterrent force to American capability. If the United 
States develops effective counterforce and BMD capabilities that ca.n threaten the 
credibility of its strategic deterrent, China will likely respond b-y increasing the 
number and effectiveness of its long-range missiles, MIRVing them, and develop-
ing counter-BMD capability, including antisatellite weapons. The purpose would 
be to sustain a strong deterrent force that can survive a f1rst strike and retaliate. 
Such a nuclear force would also be able to deal with threats from other nuclear 
weapon states in its neighborhood. China may develop additional capabilities to 
further strengthen its deterrent posture, which appears to be transitioning from 
minimum deterrence to assured retaliation, and to increase its policy options. 
Russia-United States-China 
Russia's international security concerns derive not from any specific threat but 
from the perceived negative consequences of developments that have weakened its 
position and influence in the post-Cold War world (see Fedorov, Chapter 4 of this 
volume). The Russian elite has come to view the United States and its unilateral 
approach to international governance as marginalizing Russia and threatening its 
interests in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Pacific 
region. Although Russia cooperates with China on several international issues 
and supplies advanced weapons and military technology to that country, the rapid 
rise of China is a source of apprehension in some Russian quarters. 
Seen as compensating for its weakness in conventional military capability, 
nuclear weapons are depicted as the ultimate guarantee of Russia's "real sover-
eignty." Their principal function is deterrence of the United States and China, 
but it is unclear what specific threats that nuclear weapons are sllpposed to deter. 
America's development of BMD and its counterforce capability a.re perceived to 
weaken Russia's strategic deterrent. In response, Russia appears to be accelerating 
the production of a new missile system and has called for new arms control mea-
sures. Moscow has renounced its NFU policy and now appears to be considering 
demonstration (conflict deescalation) and war-fighting roles for its nuclear weap-
ons. As with deterrence, the circumstances in which Russia's nuclear weapons 
might be used in war fighting and their specific intra war roles remain unclear. 
Although Russia-United States relations have soured during the last several 
years over the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 
planned U.S. deployment of missile defense in Eastern European countries, and 
over other issues, the United States does not view Russia as an adversary. Never-
theless, as indicated in the 2002 NPR, Russia still has a large nuclear arsenal, and 
deterrence of that country continues to be a function of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 
China too does not view Russia as an adversary. Its primary focus is the United 
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States. Nevertheless, there is a latent apprehension in China of a resurgent Russia, 
as there is of a fast-rising China in Russia. If necessary, China's strategic deterrent 
against the United States can also deter Russia. 
The Russian emphasis on nuclear deterrence appears to be grounded in sym-
bolic and psychological considerations. Beginning in Vladimir Putin's second 
term, nuclear weapons, along with the command of vast energy resources in an 
energy-hungry world, are viewed as key ingredients of national power and proof 
ofRussia's reemergence as a great power. 
Pakistan-India- China 
In the Pakistan-India dyad the primary role of nuclear weapons is deterrence. 
Islamabad views nuclear weapons as essential to offset Indian superiority in con-
ventional arms and deter a large-scale conventional military attack on its home-
land (see Khan and Lavoy, Chapter 7 of this volume). New Delhi too sees nuclear 
weapons primarily in a deterrent role, not only against Pakistan but also against 
China (see Rajagopalan, Chapter 6 of this volume). Despite scholarly and inter-
national predictions to the contrary, nuclear deterrence has worked in the Pakistan-
India dyad during both the covert and the overt periods (Hagerty 1998). There 
has not been a large-scale war between the two countries since they acquired 
nuclear weapon capability. The nuclear shadow limited the objectives, means, and 
geography of the 1999 Kargil conflict. 
In the early years of the overt nuclear period, Pakistan, and in response India, 
attempted coercive diplomacy and explored limited war under nuclear conditions. 
Deploying the risk of escalation to nuclear war as a shield, Pakistan sought to alter 
the actual Line of Control (LoC) and to force India to the negotiating table to dis-
cuss the Kashmir issue. Islamabad was partially successful in its effort. However, 
the defeat of Pakistani forces, their withdrawal from Kargil, and India's insistence 
that the LoC could not be altered demonstrate the limitation of nuclear weapons 
in a coercive diplomacy role. International support for India's position and the 
perception of Pakistan as a dangerous and irresponsible nuclear weapon state also 
highlight the political liability of using nuclear weapons in a revisionist role. In 
the wake of the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, New Delhi seri-. 
ously explo~ed ambitious notions of limited war, including strikes on insurgent 
groups based in Pakistan; but these were considered too dangerous and dropped. 
India's attempt at coercive diplomacy and limited war failed (Basrur 2005). New 
Delhi recognized that nuclear deterrence is effective only against a narrow range 
of threats-essentially against large-scale conventional attack and nuclear attack. 
Nuclear weapons cannot deter lower-level conventional military incursions, mili-
tant insurgencies, or crossborder terrorism. Pakistan's and India's failed attempts 
revealed the limitations of nuclear weapons in the coercive diplomacy and limited 
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war roles in this dyad. A long view of the recent history suggests that basic deter-
rence is the primary function of nuclear weapons. Although India has expressed 
interest in missile defense and supports the American effort in this area, it is un-
likely to develop substantial strategic defense capability in the near future. Any 
Indian advance in strategic defense would likely be neutralized by Pakistan. 
Among the major powers, China is the primary concern for India. However, 
India does not fear an existential threat or a large-scale conventional or nuclear 
attack from that country. Unlike Pakistan, China is viewed as a responsible nu-
clear weapon state that is unlikely to engage in adventurism. Further, India is 
confident that it has sufficient conventional military capability to qeal with lim-
ited and large-scale conventional attacks by China. India's strategic concern with 
China is twofold: one is Chinese strategic support for Pakistan; the second is the 
strategic (nuclear) imbalance with China, which it is believed could compromise 
India's strategic autonomy and disadvantage its quest for power and influence in 
the region (see Rajagopalan, Chapter 6 of this volume). Although India is not 
worried about a Chinese nuclear attack, New Delhi is vigilant and is developing 
long-range missiles that can reach most major Chinese cities. It aims over time to 
develop a robust nuclear deterrent against China to add to its already strong con-
ventional deterrence. 
North Korea- United States-South Korea 
On the Korean peninsula, nuclear weapons are relevant primarily in basic and 
extended deterrence functions. As indicated earlier, nuclear deterrence has as-
sumed greater salience for Pyongyang (see Park and Lee, Chapter 9 of this vol-
ume). In contrast, the salience of nuclear weapons in the security strategies of the 
United States and South Korea declined in the 1990s (see Choi and Park, Chap-
ter 13 of this volume). The North Korean nuclear test, however, has resurrected 
South Korea's interest in extended nuclear deterrence. 
The primary function of North Korea's small and unproven nuclear weapon 
capability is basic deterrence: to neutralize the U.S. and South Korean balance of 
power advantage and deter a preventive attack by the United States (see Park and 
Lee, Chapter 9 of this volume). North Korea can threaten U.S. forces and allies in 
East Asia, but it does not have missiles that can reach the United States. Its pres-
ent very limited capability cannot support offensive strategies. Any attack on U.S. 
forces deployed in East Asia or on American allies would be suicidal. North Ko-
rea's nuclear weapon program provides bargaining leverage in its negotiations with 
the other five countries in the Six-Party Talks. Pyongyang has skillfully used that 
leverage to secure economic benefits, political and diplomatic recognition, and se-
curity assurances that would help prolong the Kim Jong Il regime. Like Pakistan, 
North Korea may in due course seek to deploy the risk of escalation to nuclear 
war by engaging in lower-level violence to extract concessions from its neighbors. 
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But such action would be risky. Basic deterrence will remain the primary security 
value of nuclear weapons for North Korea in the next decade or two. 
North Korea's nuclear test has resurrected interest in South Korea to reaffirm 
the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. Seoul views that commitment as cru• 
cial to maintaining its nonnuclear posture and as a fallback while building its own 
"national self-reliant defense" capability and resolving the conflict with North 
Korea through bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In the highly unlikely event 
that North Korea uses nuclear weapons against South Korea, other U.S. allies, 
or American forces in the region, the United States would certainly retaliate, al-
though whether it would use nuclear weapons remains uncertain. In addition to 
deterring a North Korean attack, the United States may be developing the capa-
bility for offensive and defensive counterforce roles to destroy the limited strategic 
assets of North Korea. Whether the United States has the confidence to embark 
on an offensive course of action and whether any political and military purpose 
will be served by it remain unclear. 
Israel and Iran 
Dissuading preemptive or preventive military attack and deterring large-scale 
conventional aggression are the primary roles of nuclear weapons for countries 
that face existential threats. For Israel, nuclear weapons are an insurance against 
large-scale conventional attack by a coalition of Arab states that could threaten 
its viability as a sovereign state (see Cohen, Chapter 8 of this volume). Although 
what constitutes an existential threat has been debated, it appears that the crossing 
of certain red lines could trigger the retaliatory use of nuclear weapons. Possible 
scenarios include Arab penetration oflsrael's post-1949 borders, destruction ofls-
rael's air force, massive attacks on Israeli cities, and the use of nuclear weapons on 
Israeli territory. Iflsrael has developed the technology to produce battlefield tacti-
cal nuclear weapons (this is not certain), it would signal a shift in policy to include 
a war-fighting role for nuclear weapons. Israel's existential deterrence nuclear 
policy is linked to maintaining nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. To preserve 
that monopoly, Israel undertook a preventive military attack on the Iraqi Osirak 
reactor in 1981. In 2007, Israel undertook preventive military action against an 
alleged nuclear facility in Syria. Some observers believe that it might take similar 
action against Iranian nuclear facilities (Raas and Long 2007). 
Deterrence of a U.S. attack is the primary driving force behind Iran's quest 
for nuclear weapons. Enhancing the theocratic regime's legitimacy at home and 
supporting its great power ambitions in the region are important considerations as 
well (see Hagerty, Chapter 10 of this volume). Should Iran acquire nuclear weap-
ons, like Pakistan it may venture to use them in a coercive diplomacy role, but 
this is not a near-term prospect. Deterrence will be the key function. A nuclear 
Iran is likely to make the deterrence function oflsrael's nuclear arsenal more ex-
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plicit and Iran focused. It may also further strengthen the Arab states' security ties 
with the United States. The U.S. commitment to them may include an implicit 
extended nuclear deterrence dimension as in the case of the U.S. commitment to 
Taiwan, although the security commitment itself would be explicit. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that basic deterrence is the primary 
function of the nuclear arsenals of the major powers in the Asian security region. 
China, Russia, and India all seek to balance and deter a stronger power that is or 
could become an adversary. The United States seeks to deter a rising China and a 
Russia that still has a large nuclear arsenat.l Deterrence is also the key role for the 
nuclear arsenals (or nuclear quests) of states with acute or existential security con-
cerns like Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and Iran. Some states may seek to exploit 
the coercive potential of nuclear weapons to alter the status quo or blackmail non-
nuclear neighbors. Such roles carry a high-risk premium and heavy political and 
economic costs with a low probability of success. Consequently these will not be 
central functions of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. The United States 
is developing offensive and defensive capabilities, but it appears unlikely that these 
will be sufficiently effective to blunt with confidence the strategic deterrent forces 
of China or Russia. They may be more potent against lesser nuclear powers but 
residual doubt would still induce caution in employing nuclear weapons against 
them in these roles. 
Asymmetric, Diverse, and Dynamic 
Deterrence Strategies 
The dominant conception of deterrence during the Cold War was grounded 
in the strategic interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union, two 
superpowers with vast nuclear and conventional arsenals who were locked in an 
intense ideological and strategic struggle. Deterrence between them that was fo-
cused on the Central European front was specific, immediate, and rested on mu-
tual vulnerability to each other's secure second-strike capability. As elaborated in 
Chapter 2, other forms of deterrence, including existential, minimum, opaque, 
and recessed deterrence, also existed during the Cold War. These, however, re-
mained on the periphery because the Soviet-American confrontation dominated 
international security. 
There is no comparable overarching global security dynamic in the present 
period, and national power including nuclear capabilities span a wide spectrum. 
Except possibly between the United States and Russia, nuclear deterrence today 
operates largely in a condition of asymmetric power relationships. Using its still rel-
atively large nuclear arsenal, Russia too seeks to deter a far more powerful United 
States from a position of weakness. China seeks to deter the dominant United 
States. India seeks to deter a fast-growing China that has a more advanced nuclear 
arsenal, as well as a weaker Pakistan, which has comparable nuclear capabilities. 
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Pakistan seeks to deter a far larger and conventionally stronger India. From its 
position of undeclared nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, Israel seeks to deter 
conventional military attack by a coalition of Arab states. And isolated North 
Korea and Iran seek to deter the world's only superpower, the United States. In 
all the above cases, weaker powers view nuclear weapons as an important means 
to deter states with greater nuclear and conventional military capabilities. The 
United States, on the other hand, seeks to deter multiple threats or contingencies 
from a position of unmatched military capability. In nearly every case, deterrence 
is a strategy between unequal powers. Asymmetry is now the dominant condition 
for deterrence. Combined with, the small size of Asian nuclear forces and their 
limited capabilities, asymmetry has resulted in three basic types of deterrence 
strategies-existential deterrence, minimum deterrence, and assured retaliation. 
No one conception of deterrence dominates thinking about nuclear strategy 
in the Asian security region. Each state's choice of strategy hinges on its strate-
gic purpose, capabilities, and circumstances. Existential deterrence captures the 
nuclear postures of Israel and North Korea; it is also likely to be the posture of 
a nuclear Iran; minimum deterrence is the formal label attached to the nuclear 
strategies of Pakistan, India, and China; and the United States and Russia retain 
the capability for assured retaliation. Existential deterrence, minimum deterrence, 
and assured retaliation strategies are conceptually interconnected and overlapping. 
All three strategies rely on the threat of punishment but differ in the degree of 
certainty of retaliation and the force level required to deter. They can be viewed 
as part of a continuum. Existential and minimum deterrence are not necessarily 
preferred endpoints but convenient or necessary way stations on the path to as-
sured retaliation. 
Existential Deterrence 
Existential deterrence is rooted in the belief that the very existence of a stock-
pile of nuclear weapons would induce caution if the political goal and military 
engagement were clear. It was advocated during the Cold War (as an alternative 
to the assured retaliation strategy) to argue against relative destruction capabili-
ties and competitive armaments, and for the credibility of the American extended 
deterrence commitment in Europe. The idea of existential deterrence has been 
adapted in the contemporary period as a strategy for states that have only nascent 
or undeclared nuclear forces and whose primary security concern is survival. In 
this adaptation, as the stake and resolve are clear, a simple capability to carry out 
an undifferentiated countervalue strike is adequate to deter the adversary. Such a 
strategy was deemed to characterize Indian and Pakistani nuclear behavior in the 
1980s and 1990s before they became overt nuclear weapon states (Hagerty 1998). 
The Cold War-type existential deterrence is discernible now in the nuclear 
policy oflsrael and the adapted version in that of North Korea. For Israel, a strong 
Nuclear Weapons and National Security 497 
conventional military capability remains the bedrock of defense. At the same 
time, it has developed a substantial nuclear arsenal, which is viewed as insurance 
of last resort. The sole purpose of Israel's undeclared but substantial nuclear ar-
senal is to deter existential threats and, if absolutely necessary, to retaliate against 
that adversary. However, it has not issued any explicit nuclear threat. The Israeli 
political leadership believes that mere knowledge by friend and foe that Israel pos-
sesses a substantial and operational nuclear arsenal is sufficient to deter adversaries 
(see Cohen, Chapter 8 of this volume). Should Israel's nuclear monopoly in the 
Middle East be threatened, say by a nuclear Iran, its deterrence strategy would 
become more explicit and possibly move in the direction of assured retaliation or 
even war fighting. 
The adapted version of existential deterrence characterizes the strategy of 
North Korea. The purpose of its nascent nuclear weapon capability is to offset 
the growing imbalance in conventional military capability and deter the United 
States. Although estimates vary, Pyongyang is believed to have enough weapon-
grade plutonium for about six to ten bombs (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar 
2005). It has also developed short- and medium-range missiles that can potentially 
carry warheads to regional targets. North Korea does not have missiles that can 
reach the United States. A long-range missile was tested in 1998 with mixed suc-
cess. North Korea still has several problems to overcome before it can be deemed 
to possess an operational nuclear arsenaL Nevertheless, Pyongyang believes that 
the possession of even a fledgling ability provides North Korea with a deterrence 
capability that can augment its conventional deterrence against the United States 
(see Park and Lee, Chapter 9 of this volume). The potential to inflict quick and 
substantial damage on targets in South Korea and Japan would deter the United 
States from undertaking preventive military action against North Korea like the 
action it took against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. 
Existential deterrence of the second kind is also likely to be Iran's strategy 
if it succeeds in its quest for nuclear weapons (Hagerty, Chapter ro of this vol-
ume). As in North Korea, the foremost concern of Iran's political elite is the sur-
vival of the revolutionary Iranian state and the incumbent leadership. Nuclear 
weapon capability is believed to be essential to regime security. It would offset 
Iran's weakness in conventional military capability, substantially increase the cost 
of confrontation with Iran, and deter the United States from invading Iran to 
topple the theocratic regime and reverse the revolution. Nuclear-capable North 
· Korea has been relatively successful in fending off U.S. aggression, and gaining 
acceptance of the Kim Jong 11 regime that was previously condemned as morally 
despicable. The other nonnuclear member of the axis (Saddam Hussein's Iraq), 
however, was invaded twice by the United States, and ultimately the regime in 
that country was toppled. The lessons from North Korea and Iraq may drive Iran 
to continue its covert quest for nuclear weapon capability. The danger for Iran, 
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however, is that it is still several years away from acquiring even a fledgling capa-
bility. Meanwhile it is subject to preventive attack by the United States or Israel. 
Minimum Deterrence 
The strategy of minimum deterrence is rooted in the premise that a small, 
easily concealable nuclear force has an inherent retaliation capability and that the 
level of damage caused by a small number of nuclear weapons in a countervalue 
strike is sufficient to deter countries with much stronger nuclear arsenals. Mini-
mum deterrence is the formal label used by governments in Pakistan, India, and 
China to describe their national nuclear postures. All three countries have made 
only a few brief official statements on their nuclear strategies. These have at times 
been contradictory, reflecting the secrecy and ambiguity that surround their nu-
clear weapon capabilities but also suggesting that their nuclear strategies are still 
evolving. Official statements and interpretations by analysts suggest that Pakistan, 
India, and China seek to deter large-scale conventional and any form of nuclear 
attack on their homeland by threatening nuclear retaliation. 
The minimum deterrence strategy of Pakistan appears to place a higher pre-
mium on risk and uncertainty than that of India, which emphasizes certainty of 
retaliation and massive damage, and of China, which appears to have charac-
teristics of an assured retaliation strategy. Pakistan has rejected India's proposal 
that the two countries adopt an NFU policy. It sees the possibility of first use as 
strengthening its deterrence strategy. Making public its nuclear threshold would 
provide space for India to use its huge conventional military capability and reduce 
the deterrent value of Pakistan's nuclear force (see Khan and Lavoy, Chapter 7 of 
this volume). Islamabad seeks to constrain and deter India by exploiting the risk of 
escalation to nuclear war as well as by threat of nuclear retaliation. 
India and China have committed themselves to an NFU policy because it serves 
their strategic interests, but also in the belief that the value of nuclear weapons is 
primarily political and that they are weapons of last resort. Both countries have 
since qualifted their commitments, and the security value of the NFU policy is 
now being debated in China. In the wake of the I998 tests, India quickly commit-
ted itself not to use nuclear weapons first and to use such weapons only in retali-
ation against a nuclear attack. However, subsequent statements that India might 
retaliate with nuclear weapons against chemical and biological attacks, and against 
attacks on Indian forces anywhere, have loosened its earlier commitment to limit 
retaliation to nuclear attack on its territory, opening up the possibility that India 
might use nuclear weapons first in other situations (see Rajagopalan, Chapter 6 of 
this volume). China has qualified its earlier absolute commitment that it would 
"never at anytime or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons." 
The emphasis in its NFU commitment has shifted to nonnuclear weapon states. 
Although NFU is still the official policy, some Chinese analysts believe it should 
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be reconsidered in relation to the Taiwan conflict. They have argued that a first-
use policy would strengthen deterrence against American intervention. Others 
argue that, given the American threat of prevention, a first-use policy wou~d cre-
ate uncertainty and invite a preemptive strike. In Chapter 5 of this volume, Chu 
and Rong argue that the NFU policy safeguards China's interests by contributing 
to greater certainty and preventing escalation to nuclear war. From an operational 
perspective, the NFU pledge may not be meaningful, as states cannot be certain 
that the pledge will hold in crisis situations. 
The minimum deterrence strategies of India and China have also been trend-
ing in the direction of assured retaliation. In India, this shift is more ~vident as an 
idea than in terms of capability (see Rajagopalan, Chapter 6 of this volume). Em-
phasizing credibility, the Indian strategy of minimum deterrence seeks to move 
beyond the risk and uncertainty that are characteristic of the minimum deter-
rence strategy. By stressing certainty of retaliation, it opens up tile possibility of 
moving to a full assured retaliation strategy in due course. For now, however, the 
emphasis remains on a small nuclear force that can survive a first strike and inflict a 
high level of retaliatory damage on the adversary. The interpretation of minimum 
deterrence in China has shifted from existential deterrence in the early years to 
minimum deterrence as understood in the literature; it is now trending toward as-
sured retaliation. IainJohnston (1995-96) labels China's present strategy as "limited 
deterrence" while Chu and Rong (Chapter 5 of this volume) call it "large-scale 
minimum deterrence." Although the labels may be different, there is agreement 
that the Chinese understanding and practice of minimum deterrence is dynamic. 
The contemporary Chinese understanding of minimum deterrence reduces the 
emphasis on risk and places much greater emphasis on survival and certainty of 
retaliation. Unlike in India, this shift is reflected in the development of capabili-
ties as well. The Chinese conception of minimum deterrence b.as also b~come 
more relational; that is, it has become more sensitive to change in adversaries' force 
structure. Over the longer term, the minimum deterrence strategies of China, and 
possibly India and Pakistan, will likely acquire assured retaliation characteristics. 
Assured Retaliation 
The United States and Russia still have large nuclear arsenals and secure second-
strike capabilities that can inflict unacceptable damage on each other and on 
China. China and Russia believe that the strategic defense capabilities under 
development by the United States would erode the effectiveness of their strate-
gic deterrent forces. If the United States is successful in building effective stra-
tegic defenses against Russia and China, and these two countries are unable to 
neutralize them, one key basis (lack of defense against nuclear weapons) for deter-
rence dominance would be undermined. The development of effective defense 
capabilities by China and Russia would also have a similar effect. However, even 
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if deterrence is no longer technologically dominant, this does not automatically · 
imply that the strategy of deterrence would cease to be the preferred strategy for 
employment of nuclear weapons. The choice of strategy is a function of both po-
litical objectives and capabilities. 
In addition to diversity, deterrence strategies in the Asian security region are in 
the midst of change and likely to evolve further. The late entrants are still coming 
to terms with their status as nuclear weapon states and are developing strategies 
appropriate to their security situations and capabilities. The older nuclear weapon 
states are adapting to new strategic circumstances, threats, and capabilities. The 
United States made a bold attempt in the 2002 NPR to map its nuclear strate-
gies and capabilities for a new era. Though it is still official policy, the NPR has 
failed to crystallize support, and with the termination of the Bush administration 
in January 2009, its future remains uncertain. Although Russia has expressed its 
view that nuclear weapons remain important, it also has not developed a coher-
ent strategy for the new era. Chinese nuclear strategy has evolved and will likely 
continue to do so with a focus on the United States. 
General Deterrence Postures 
Contemporary deterrence postures are more in line with the idea of general 
deterrence than immediate deterrence; the latter applies in very few cases with 
limited systemic consequence.2 The dominance of general deterrence postures is 
due to the absence of severe confrontations. Although the United States, Russia, 
China, and India all face several threats, immediate situations that may involve 
nuclear weapons are small; most other threats are long range and still hypotheti-
cal. Of the immediate situations, only in the India-Pakistan conflict are the two· 
protagonists locked in a military confrontation. The Taiwan conflict has wit-
nessed periodic tensions and relatively minor military dashes, but the United 
States and China are not locked in a military confrontation. A military standoff 
persists on the Korean peninsula, but the intensity of conflict has declined over 
time. Although general deterrence postures also existed during the Cold War, in 
large measure they were extensions of the severe confrontation and the immediate 
deterrence situation between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe. 
Reflecting the multiple threats confronting the United States, the 2002 NPR 
categorizes contingencies as immediate (well-recognized current dangers), po-
tential (plausible, but not immediate), and unexpected (sudden and unpredicted). 
North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are identified as countries that could 
be involved in immediate, potential, and unexpected contingencies. China is an 
immediate contingency (Taiwan) and a potential contingency (modernization of 
its military capability combined with conflicting strategic objectives could re-
sult in a hostile situation). Russia is identified as a possible concern in the event 
that Russo-American relations deteriorate. Moscow is dissatisfied with American 
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dominance, and some Russian quarters worry about a rising China; but neither 
country poses an immediate threat to Russia. For China, the most urgent concern 
is American military intervention in the event of a conflict across the :Taiwan 
Strait, and a medium-term worry is American containment of China; the formi-
dable nuclear arsenal of Russia and a nuclear India are also of concern. For India, 
Pakistan is the more immediate challenge; the threat from China is long term but 
considered more important. For Pakistan, India is an immediate threat; for North 
Korea the United States poses an immediate threat. The existential threat posed 
by Arab states is the primary challenge for Israel, but the immediacy of this threat 
has declined. Iran's nuclear quest is emerging as a key security concern in Israel 
(see Cohen, Chapter 8 of this volume; Inbar 2008). 
Except possibly in the India-Pakistan dyad, the states concerned have attempted 
to deal with their security concerns by adopting general deterrence postures. The 
United States, for example, has opted for a nuclear doctrine that Wirtz (Chapter 3 
of this volume) terms a "strange mix of deterrent, war-in-sight, and disarmament 
policies." Although the 2002 NPR (U.S. Department of Defense 2002) identi-
fies several contingencies and seeks to develop an array of capabilities, it does not 
specify precise actions that would result in nuclear retaliation. Even in relation 
to North Korea and Iran, despite the rhetoric, Washington has not specified red 
lines that, if crossed, would cause it to retaliate. In the case of Taiwan too, the 
American deterrence posture is general. Washington has stated its general goal (no 
unification by force) and responded to crisis situations like that in 1995-96. It has 
not specified particular developments that could result in nuclear retaliation. It 
hopes that U.S. military might, combined with Washington's response to earlier 
crisis situations, will be sufficient to deter China from taking military action and 
that uncertainty about the U.S. response would dissuade Taiwan from seeking to 
alter the status quo. 
Likewise, China has opted for a general deterrence posture, toward both the 
United States and other nuclear weapon states. In the case ofTaiwan, the Chinese 
military buildup emphasizes missile and conventional military capabilities. The 
deterrent role of nuclear weapons is implied in the situation; there have been no 
explicit Chinese threats to use nuclear weapons in a war-fighting or deterrent role. 
Beijing also hopes that its military modernization, its growing power and influence, 
and political and economic interaction and cooperation will dissuade other nuclear 
weapon states from contemplating the use of force to resolve disputes with China. 
Similarly, India seems to be opting for a general deterrence posture toward 
China. India's lack of urgency in developing a deterrent force against China should 
be seen in this light. Despite its bluster, Russia has not identified specific develop-
ments that would require nuclear retaliation. Moscow hopes that its formidable 
nuclear arsenal will induce respect and caution in other states. Finally, although 
Israel's nuclear force has a very specific mission (the survival of Israel), Tel Aviv 
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has not publicly specified acts that would prompt its nuclear retaliation. Shimon 
Peres has indicated that it is sufficient for Israel's friends and foes to know that it 
has this capability (Hoffman 2006). 
The effectiveness and shortcomings of general deterrence are discussed in 
Chapter 18. For now I want to emphasize that an immediate deterrence-like situ-
ation exists only in the India-Pakistan dyad and that the consequences of this 
situation are geographically and strategically limited. In all other instances, gen-
eral deterrence dominates thinking about nuclear deterrence, including extended 
nuclear deterrence. 
The Continuing Relevance of Extended Deterrence 
Among the nuclear weapon states, only the United States possesses the motive 
and means to extend the deterrence function of its nuclear arsenal. Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Australia view the American extended nuclear deterrence 
commitment as contributing to their national security. Russia has the capability 
to provide extended deterrence commitment and plans on it for Byelorussia and 
Armenia, although the threats against which these two countries would require 
such strategic protection remain unclear. China, India, .and Pakistan do not have 
the strategic imperative or the capability to provide strategic protection to an al-
lied country against a threat from another nuclear power. 
U.S. extended deterrence commitments help deter possible attacks against al-
lies. Such attacks, however, are not imminent. Most threats are long range and 
hypothetical. Thus, for the most part, extended deterrence is general and psy-
chological, designed to reassure allies against long-range threats and to prevent 
them from pursuing independent nuclear options. Extended deterrence also helps 
allies preserve their strategic autonomy. However, it also constrains their strategic 
choices, limits the flexibility in employment of their conventional military force, 
and creates fears of abandonment and entrapment. Maintaining a fine balance 
between relying on the U.S. commitment and developing their own defense and 
deterrence capability is a key challenge for South Korea and in some ways for 
Taiwan, which has only an implicit U.S. commitment. It is less of a challenge for 
Japan and Australia. Both these countries seek strong alliance relationships with 
the United States. 
The formidable U.S. nuclear arsenal makes its extended deterrence commit-
ment effective and credible; at the same time national sensitivities, differing threat 
perceptions, competing demands among its allies, the lack of an integrated com-
mand structure, and U.S. worry about entrapment make crafting and implement-
ing a viable strategy of extended deterrence more difficult. 
Among America's allies in Asia, nuclear weapons have become a key concern 
primarily in Japan. It does not face an existential threat and does not have seri-
ous international disputes that could involve the use of nuclear weapons. Tokyo's 
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concerns center on the strategic vulnerability of a Japan surrounded by nuclear 
weapon states, the negative strategic consequences of nuclear weapons in the hands 
of competitors for the nature and content of order in East Asia, and the coQstraints 
they may impose on Japan's policy options (see Green and Furukawa, Chapter 12 
of this volume). Although Japan has periodically explored the nuclear option since 
the Chinese nuclear test in I964, for a number of reasons (strategic considerations, 
domestic politics, financial cost, and international repercussions), reliance on the 
American nuclear umbrella was seen as a better alternative. North Korea's nuclear 
test in October 2006 stimulated such an exploration, and the conclusion again was 
to seek reaffirmation of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. 
Tokyo sees the U.S. extended deterrence commitment as the central pillar of 
its nuclear policy. The other pillars are nuclear disarmament of North Korea, 
development of BMD, maintenance of a latent nuclear weapon capability, and 
strong support for the international nonproliferation regime. The key question 
for Japan is how to ensure the effectiveness and credibility of the U.S. extended 
nuclear deterrence commitment in a new security environment. Although declar-
atory statements by high-ranking U.S. leaders were deemed sufficient in the past, 
Japan now seeks more concrete assurance. Tokyo's credibility concern centers on 
three issues: (I) a strategic perception gap, (2) a possible decoupling of extended 
nuclear deterrence for Japan from basic deterrence in defense of the U.S. home-
land, and (3) the inequality in the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. 
That the U.S. approach to China, North Korea, and Russia may differ from that 
of Japan's underlies the strategic perception gap. Washington may take unilateral 
policy actions that leave Japan in a vulnerable position. The decoupling concern 
is informed by a modernizing Chinese nuclear arsenal that can increasingly hit 
a wide set of targets on the U.S. mainland, and the development of long-range 
nuclear missiles by North Korea. Would the United States be willing to engage in 
nuclear retaliation in the defense ofJapan if such action could result in substantial 
damage to its homeland? Finally, prohibitions or restrictions issuing from consti-
tutional, legal, and normative considerations prevent Japan from fully sharing in 
the collective defense of Japan and the United States. This may weaken American 
commitment to the security of Japan. 
To shore up the credibility of extended deterrence, certain quarters in Japan ad-
vocate relaxing its commitment to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and amend-
ing legislation that prevents Japan from intercepting missiles targeted at the United 
States, building a layered BMD system against North Korea and China, and main-
taining a latent capability to develop nuclear weapons. Japan is also seeking greater 
dialogue with the United States; input into and a measure of control over U.S. 
nuclear policy in 'Asia; and institutional mechanisms to implement dialogue, in-
put, and controL These measures would move the U.S. commitment beyond the 
declaratory position with which the United States has been comfortable. For a 
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number of reasons-including secrecy and lack of trust in Japan's ability to handle 
highly classified information, inadequate capacity on the Japanese side, perceived 
constraints on U.S. flexibility, and the complexities of crafting an extended deter-
rence strategy that would adequately meet not only Japan's requirements but also 
that of its other allies-Washington has been unwilling to move in the direction 
urged by Japan. Nevertheless, Washington may have to take some measures tore-
assure its key ally. Because Japan does not confront an immediate security threat, 
those measures could still be largely process oriented within the framework of 
general deterrence, with the United States retaining full control over decision 
making. 
In South Korea, the American extended deterrence commitment can be traced 
to the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty and more specifically to the 1957 New Look 
policy of the Eisenhower administration. The extended deterrence commitment 
was crucial for the security of South Korea in the first three decades of the Cold 
War. In the 1990s South Korea's perception of the North Korean threat declined 
markedly and extended nuclear deterrence became almost a non-issue except dur-
ing the first nuclear crisis. 
The 2006 North Korean nuclear test, however, resurrected South Korean in-
terest in extended nuclear deterrence. Upon Seoul's insistence the term extended 
nuclear deterrence was included in the joint communique of the thirty-eighth Se-
curity Consultative Meeting that occurred soon after the North Korean nuclear 
test. The South Korean rationale for insisting on the inclusion of extended nuclear 
deterrence is that the American commitment provides a bridging capability while 
South Korea builds its defense capabilities to take the lead responsibility for its 
own defense. The American nuclear umbrella will remain relevant until North 
Korea gives up its nuclear weapon capability (see Choi and Park, Chapter 13 of 
this volume). It also prevents South Korea from exploring a nuclear option. At 
the same time, the South Korean public and political leaders are deeply conflicted 
and divided on the security alliance with the United States. They fear becoming 
entrapped in U.S. preemptive military action against North Korea and elsewhere. 
Reliance on the American nuclear umbrella is also inconsistent with its nonnu-
clear posture, its policy to improve relations with North Korea, and its goal to be 
free of the vagaries of American policy. 
For its part, the United States no longer subscribes to a traditional trip-wire 
strategy. It is reluctant to spell out details of its commitments, inch.Jding which 
threats could result in nuclear retaliation or how nuclear deterrence is linked 
to U.S. and South Korean conventional forces. The United States seeks to de.,. 
ter North Korea by issuing general threats and demonstrating its vastly superior 
military capability in different parts of the world. Since the United States and 
the Republic of Korea have sufficient conventional forces to deter and defeat a 
North Korean military action against South Korea, extended nuclear deterrence is 
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largely symbolic and psychological; the general deterrence posture of the United 
States can serve this function. However, the commitment will become compli-
cated if North Korea develops long-range nuclear missiles that can hit targets in 
the United States. 
Taipei is less conflicted; in fact, the outgoing Democratic "Progressive Party 
government desires and would be happy to secure a more firm American com-
mitment to the defense of Taiwan against a Chinese attack (see Wang, Chapter 14 
of this volume). However, since the Sino-American normalization of relations in 
1978, the American security commitment to Taiwan has been implicit under a 
policy of strategic ambiguity. U.S. nuclear weapons may have an il;nplied role in 
deterring a large-scale Chinese attack on Taiwan and on any Cbinese propensity 
to escalate hostilities to the nuclear level. However, this is not an explicit com-
mitment. The United States will decide unilaterally whether, when, and how to 
intervene in a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. As China modernizes its nuclear 
arsenal and further develops its capability to hit military and civilian targets in 
the United States, the likelihood that Washington would consider using nuclear 
weapons in hostilities across the Taiwan Strait will become more remote. Should 
Washington decide to intervene, it would rely on conventional military capabil-
ity. The limited American intervention in the 1995-96 crisis served not only to 
show U.S. resolve against Chinese intimidation of Taiwan, but also to demon-
strate American military prowess to restrain China and others from seriously con-
templating, threatening, or using force against America's interests in Asia. 
Unlike Taiwan, Australia is a formal and close ally of the United States, and 
Washington is firmly committed to the security of that country. Despite this, the 
nature of the American extended nuclear deterrence commitment to Australia 
both during the Cold War and now lacks specific operational content (see Lyon, 
Chapter 15 of this volume). The only purpose of extended deterrence was and is 
to deter a nuclear attack against Australia. This is a remote possibility and a lim-
ited mandate that could be fulfilled through general assurances without issuing 
specific threats and developing specific capabilities. Nevertheless, Australia views 
the extended nuclear deterrence commitment as important in security and sym-
bolic terms and also for other benefits (access to American military technology for 
conventional force modernization, and the elevation of Australia's international 
status and role, for example). 
Further, Canberra has all along viewed the possession of nuclear weapons by 
risk-averse, responsible major powers and nuclear deterrence among them as con-
tributing to global and regional stability. The contributions that nuclear deter-
rence can make to Australia's security and to global and regional stability are the 
basis on which Canberra rationalizes its conflicting nuclear policies-support for 
nuclear nonproliferation, opposition to nuclear testing, support for the Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty, and membership in the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon 
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Free Zone while relying on the American nuclear umbrella and hosting certain 
U.S. nuclear facilities. In the wake of 9/II and the entry of new risk-tolerant nu-
clear weapon states such as Pakistan and North Korea, Australia is reevaluating the 
salience of nuclear deterrence for its security and for stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Rather than dilute security relations, the changed security environment 
has deepened Australia's security alliance with the United States and it still values 
the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that a~though they appear relevant to a small num-
ber of situations, nuclear weapons have a far-reaching influence on the national 
security strategies and interaction among nuclear weapon states and their allies. 
They circumscribe the strategic interaction of major powers, play an important 
role in the management of key regional conflicts that could escalate to major war, 
and condition the role of force in the international politics in the Asian security 
region. They also make a significant contribution to regional peace and stability, 
which is the subject of the final chapter. Before I turn to that, I would like to 
make brief observations on two issues that were raised in the Introduction. Time 
and space considerations prevent a more detailed discussion of these issues. One, 
the roles and strategies of nuclear weapons discussed in this chapter are not unique 
to Asia. They are a function of specific histories, strategic circumstances, secu-
rity challenges, and national nuclear capabilities. As these circumstances change, 
so will the roles and strategies, which are also a function of the nuclear revolu-
tion. The dominance of deterrence, for example, is a consequence of the nuclear 
revolution. Asian countries are not immune to the logic of that revolution. The 
tendency toward ambiguity and secrecy is not a cultural trait but a function of 
the belief that such ambiguity and secrecy enhances the deterrent value of small 
nuclear forces. Ambiguity also characterized nuclear policies and strategies dur-
ing the Cold War (Kissinger 1957); now it characterizes American policy on the 
Taiwan issue and Israel's nuclear policy and strategy. 
On common discourse, although certain countries use similar terms like mini-
mum deterrence, limited war, no-first-use, and so forth, the understanding and opera-
tionalization of these ideas vary substantially across countries. The development 
of a common discourse is hindered by several factors, including the tendency to 
downplay the significance of nuclear weapons for reasons of political correctness 
and in the interest of secrecy and ambiguity. As nuclear weapons will continue to 
exist and national arsenals will grow in size and complexity, it is imperative and 
useful to begin bilateral and multilateral dialogues to foster common understand-
ing of the roles and strategies of nuclear weapons and their implications for na-
tional and regional security. Such dialogues will help build a common vocabulary 
and contribute to the development of expertise on the subject in Asia. 
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Notes 
I. That deterrence continues to be a key function of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is indi-
cated in a joint statement issued by the U.S. Secretaries for Energy, Defense, and S~ate 
(National Security and Nuclear Weapons 2007) 
2. On the meaning of and distinction between immediate and general deterrence, see 
Morgan 2003. 
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